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Rereading Code: Representation, Verification,
and a Case of Epistemic (Ir)responsibility
By Lindsay Morton
Avondale College of Higher Education, Australia

Abstract: In 2001 James Aucoin published an article that contributed significantly to the scholarship of ethics and epistemology of literary journalism studies. Drawing on the work of Lorraine Code, Aucoin combined a
“responsibilist” approach to epistemology with narrative theory to establish
standards for judging literary journalism’s truth claims. This paper offers
a re-reading of Code’s seminal text, Epistemic Responsibility, arguing that
Code’s approach in fact upholds verifiability as a key criterion for epistemic
responsibility in works of both fiction and nonfiction. Such a reading produces significantly different results when analyzing literary journalism’s
truth claims. It is the aim of this paper to follow through the implications
of rereading Epistemic Responsibility as advocating the discipline of verification. John D’Agata’s and Jim Fingal’s The Lifespan of a Fact is used as a case
study to play out some of these implications in the second half of this paper.
This playful case of epistemic irresponsibility highlights some of the key issues around truth claims in literary journalism. It is argued that such cases
have an important role in keeping the issue of “knowing well” central to the
epistemic community, thereby contributing to the flourishing discussion
around the responsible representation of reality.

I

n 2001 James Aucoin published an influential article that contributed significantly to the scholarship of ethics and epistemology of literary journalism studies. In “Epistemic Responsibility and Narrative Theory” Aucoin
identifies two scholarly approaches in a thirty-year critical debate over literary
journalism. He names Zavarzadeh, Hellman, and Heyne as scholars who have
defended literary journalism as a genre of literature, and Sims, Connery, and
Kramer among those who “have attempted to legitimize literary journalism
as a genre of journalism . . . [and] have hinged their classification scheme on
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the criterion of verifiability.”1
Verifiability is a problematic standard for the genre, Aucoin argues, owing to three key reasons: “the mounting evidence from science and philosophy
that denies the existence of a verifiable reality that can be described through
logical-positivist empiricism and affirms that reality is socially and culturally
constructed”; “the voluminous evidence that journalism constructs a truth that
is based on culturally accepted conventions”; and “dominant narrative theory,
which holds that any imposition of narrative is a moral act that results to some
extent in a fictionalization.”2 Aucoin argues that literary journalism should not
be subject to the discipline of verification, and therefore offers “a strategy of using narrative theory and epistemic ethics to judge literary journalism.”3
The framework for applying the imperatives of epistemic responsibility
to literary journalism offered in this article differs from that in “Epistemic Responsibility and Narrative Theory” in a critical way. Aucoin’s position allows
him to eschew the nonfiction/fiction distinction, argue against verification as
a key characteristic of literary journalism, and read epistemologist Lorraine
Code’s chapter “Literature, Truth and Understanding” in Epistemic Responsibility (1987) as applicable to literary journalism. He uses, for example, Code’s
following statement to support his thesis:
Where actual, historical events or characters play central roles in a work,
one expects that the research has been done accurately; but there is no outright obligation upon writers, given the long tradition of poetic license, to
tell things as they were rather than as they might have been. The onus is
thus upon the readers to be sure that any claims they make are responsible.4

A

ucoin uses this passage to support his contention that Ryszard
Kapuściński—as a model literary journalist—is “situated as an independent moral agent, responsible for what he writes, and readers, as independent
moral agents, must independently decide whether to believe him.”5 While
this is undoubtedly a salient point within the context Aucoin creates, this paper suggests that Aucoin’s reading of Code might be understood as incompatible with her overall thesis. If so, a rereading of Code’s work might produce
significantly different results. It is the aim of this paper to follow through the
implications of rereading Epistemic Responsibility in this way, thereby contributing to the flourishing discussion around the ethics of “knowing well” in
literary journalism.
Code has been critical of some aspects of her early work since its publication in 1987. She writes: “Despite my conviction that the central idea of Epistemic Responsibility is important and right, there are problems with the book,
and some of the criticisms it has produced are well taken.”6 The primary issues
include a tacit—or perhaps uncritical—liberal humanism that informs the
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approach, “where questions of power and epistemic privilege do not figure,
and an honest, well-meaning, transparently self-conscious epistemic agent
who can make of her or his circumstances what she or he will is taken for
granted”; as well as its “ambiguous relation to the metaphysical requirements
of the Anglo-American epistemological mainstream.”7 As such, the following
analysis proceeds with the acknowledgement of the limitations imposed by an
approach that lacks engagement with questions of power, culture, and affect.
Code’s work has, however, been productively applied elsewhere to unpack
issues arising from clashing epistemological traditions, epistemic privilege,
and the role of affect in substantiating truth claims—all of which are central
concerns for both scholars and practitioners.8 The value of Epistemic Responsibility, then, is in theorizing a “responsibilist” approach to literary journalism
to highlight and address issues that face practitioners in the range of choice
available when representing their subjects and their worlds.

T

he first seven chapters of Code’s book Epistemic Responsibility emphasize
that the nature of the world and limitations on human cognitive capacity impose constraints on possible forms and content of knowledge. Code
acknowledges that “there is considerable scope for freedom in making sense
of the world,” but that there are limits to “what kind of sense can responsibly
be made of the world.”9 In the chapter entitled “Literature, Truth and Understanding,” Code discusses the “truth value”10 of a literary work. Code’s
remarks on historical novels (quoted above) cite the work of Jane Austen,
Charles Dickens, George Eliot, and Leo Tolstoy as examples, which, Code
notes, conform to the generic limitations of literary realism. The argument
here is that when read in the context of the previous chapters, Code makes
a distinction between the knowledge claims of fictional and nonfictive texts.
The criteria she applies to “literary works” are verisimilitude, plausibility, and
narrative coherence,11 but, interestingly, where novels are historically situated, she is clear that verifiability is an epistemic imperative. In a discussion
of George Eliot’s Middlemarch, Code cautions that “the significance of actual
events is a source of knowledge and is verifiable.”12 She argues:
[W]e can check and compare accounts of the state of medicine at the time,
of the machinations that led to the passing of the Reform Bill, of the development of the new journalism. . . . We can only responsibly claim to know
either about the factual events or about the fictitious characters and the
intentionally fabricated juxtaposition of the two if we have good reason
to believe that the writer’s treatment of both of the real events and of the
unreal characters is a responsible treatment.13

While the onus to “know well” is on the reader here, when read in the
context of a fiction/nonfiction divide, this passage casts novelists’ and jour-
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nalists’ responsibility to truth-telling in a similar light. The key here is verifiability. While Aucoin’s reading of Code is consistent with his epistemic stance
toward the nature of literary journalism, this paper argues that there is value
in maintaining the discipline of verification for the genre. Acknowledging
this standard produces a significantly different reading of Code’s work—and
its subsequent application to literary journalism.

C

Foundationalism, Coherentism, and Responsibilism

ode’s “responsibilist” approach differs from established epistemological
traditions: foundationalist and coherentist. Foundationalists hold that
there is “knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man
[sic] could doubt it,”14 and that this knowledge forms a foundation for all
other types and systems of knowledge. For coherentists, on the other hand,
the “source of evaluation and justification of a belief or knowledge claim lies
in its relations with other beliefs or ‘knowns’ within a system; explanatory
relations or relations of probability or logic might be taken into account.”15
The foundationalist and coherentist traditions are analogous to the traditions
of literary journalism scholarship. Again, following Aucoin, scholars broadly
fall into two categories when attempting to articulate standards for the genre:
those who primarily employ narrative theory to articulate standards, such
as narrative coherence and verisimilitude, and those who advocate the application of journalistic standards, such as accuracy and verifiable content, to
works of literary journalism. Examples of those who perform literary readings
include Hollowell, Weber, and Anderson, while scholars such as Lounsberry
and Kerrane and Yagoda employ verifiability as a standard. Standards of verification can thus be understood as part of the foundationalist tradition, while
narrative theory has a correlation with coherentist theories of epistemology.
These distinctions are important in light of Code’s project. She acknowledges that foundationalism and coherentism “represent the best efforts of
epistemology so far to approach ‘the problem of knowledge,’” but also contends that enquiry is limited by the range of possible questions these approaches allow.16 A complementary approach is necessary, Code argues, to
widen the scope of epistemological investigation:
[T]here are genuine choices about how to know the world and its inhabitants, choices that become apparent only in more complex epistemic circumstances—for example, in knowing other cultures, negotiating an environmental policy, assessing the significance of certain actions and policies, or
predicting the implications of tests and experiments. Such circumstances, and
others like them, occasion questions about epistemic responsibility. In doing
so they broaden the scope of epistemology to include considerations of credibility and trust, of epistemic obligations and the legitimate scope of enquiry.17
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I

n this passage, “choice” is a key term in relation to literary journalism. The
range of possibilities available to practitioners in researching and reporting
on other cultures, assessing significance of particular events and representing
these in narrative form indeed necessitates considerations of credibility and
trust. But in the same way Code argues for a multi-perspective approach to
epistemology, an additional—complementary—mode of analysis is needed
to those offered by literary theory and the discipline of verification for literary
journalism.
This approach is particularly timely to theorize what is arguably a dominant feature of contemporary literary journalism. Historically, key literary
journalists in the tradition of Kapuściński produced important texts that did
not appear to place emphasis on journalistic standards of verification or attribution despite asserting their nonfiction status. But a new generation of
practitioners—those producing their first works of book-length literary journalism between 2000 and 2010—appear to aspire to the highest standards
of both correspondence and coherence. Critical reception has been mixed,
but contemporary literary journalists such as Adrian Nicole LeBlanc (Random
Family), Daniel Bergner (Soldiers of Light), Suketu Mehta (Maximum City),
John Vaillant (The Golden Spruce), Rajiv Chandrasekaran (Imperial Life in the
Emerald City), Andrew Westoll (The Riverbones), Dave Cullen (Columbine),
and Rebecca Skloot (The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks) demonstrate deep
commitment to both literary aims and “traditional” journalistic standards such
as verifiability, balance, and accuracy. In spite of increasingly blurred notions
of truth and reality, these practitioners arguably operate under a modus that
holds reality to be discoverable, and whose texts represent their best effort to
accurately capture it. According to William Langewiesche this is a “new form of
clean classicism”18 and is quite distinct from New Journalists’ emphasis on the
apocalyptic zeitgeist of the 1960s and attendant “hysteria” of life in that era.19
In keeping with Code’s rationale, an epistemological “responsibilist” approach opens the range of questions that can be asked of literary journalistic practice. It can also illuminate literary readings of texts where meaning
and truth are as important as the events from which they proceed. Reorienting epistemic focus from end points to processes, Code encourages wouldbe knowers to engage in “Socratic dialogue” over their knowledge claims.20
Cooper gives examples of epistemic questioning that could inform literary
journalistic practice, such as: “Do I really know what I think I know?”; “Do
I know enough to act as I do?”; “What don’t I know?”; “What are the moral
consequences of my knowing/ignorance?”; “Should I know more or acknowledge incomplete knowledge?”21 Such questioning informs not just the practice but also the criticism of literary journalism. It emphasizes the choices
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available to—and limitations imposed upon—practitioners in the way they
represent reality, as well as their responsibility to “know well.” Likewise, critics and scholars may ask these questions of practitioners to illuminate analyses, but they similarly have an obligation to know their subject well—well
enough to judge as they do—as they also engage in a process of representing
reality. This represents both challenge and opportunity when exposing literary journalism to an assessment of epistemic responsibility.
Although Code does not specifically discuss journalism, her philosophical approach is particularly apposite for this field. When differentiating her
“responsibilist” position from a “reliabilist” approach, she acknowledges that
for a person or their knowledge to be reliable establishes “a closer connection
with truth and warrantability than responsibility can establish.”22 However,
in her view, “a ‘reliable’ knower could simply be an accurate, and relatively
passive, recorder of experience,”23 whereas a responsibilist approach accounts
for the degrees of choice with regard to modes of cognitive structuring, and
the accountability that attends such choice. Here a parallel can be made with
mainstream and literary journalism: the degree of choice available to a daily
journalist when reporting an event is considerably less than that afforded a
literary journalist. A daily journalist is more likely to be judged on her reliability according to established norms such as objectivity, whereas a literary
journalist is not bound by the same rules of cognitive and narrative structuring, and arguably is more accountable to being epistemically responsible. As
Code writes: “A person can be judged responsible or irresponsible only if
she/he is clearly regarded as an agent (in this case a cognitive agent) in the
circumstances in question. An evaluation of human knowledge-seeking in
terms of responsibility is instructive precisely because of the active, creative
nature of the endeavour.”24 Clearly, in an epistemic sense, responsibilism is
just as binding on a daily journalist as reliability is on a literary journalist. The
point here is that the range of practices open to literary journalists highlights
their mandate to be responsible, whereas the regulatory effects imposed by
objectivity standards emphasizes reliability.
The rationale behind Code’s project in Epistemic Responsibility is summarized in the following passage:
Different cognitive capacities and epistemic circumstances create situations
where experience is structured, and hence the world is known, quite differently from one cognitive agent to another. Each time a moral judgment
is made, then, two parts of a situation must be assessed: the way it is apprehended and the action that is performed as a result. The former, the
apprehension, is a matter for epistemological assessment, and the moral
dimension of the situation is crucially dependent upon this epistemic
component.25

CODE 41
Conflating epistemology and ethics arguably has significant ramifications
for the theory and practice of literary journalism. To the extent that they
can be held apart for analytical purposes, ethics and epistemology should
be evaluated separately to illuminate how ethical practice is dependent on a
sound epistemic foundation. In the rest of this paper I use this rationale to
(re-)examine some issues pertinent to the practice of literary journalism, before applying some epistemic principles to a particularly contentious example
of epistemic irresponsibility.

A

“Knowing Well”

starting point when assessing epistemic responsibility is to examine the
conditions in which an individual can “know well.” Code draws on Kantian philosophy when she asserts that the manner of an individual’s structuring of reality “is dependent upon a knower’s interaction with the world and
will vary accordingly.”26 The epistemic responsibility of a literary journalist
can then be characterized as a responsibility to interact with the world in a
way that enables a practitioner to anchor the coherence of meaning to the
correspondence of empirically verifiable reality. According to Code, it is not
contradictory to claim that knowledge is created through active exploration,
perception, thinking, and imagining, and that knowledge is objective.27 She
writes:
Although there are many ways of knowing legitimately so-called, evidence
strongly favors the claim that these are ways of knowing one real world.
The patterns that can be selected are limited in practice by the necessity
that they conform, to some degree, to this objective reality. To this extent,
objects dictate the nature of the synthesis.28

Arguably, the idea that objective knowledge is discoverable by individuals
underpins much contemporary literary journalism practice. Both anecdotal
evidence from practitioners and current scholarship support such a contention. Literary journalist and scholar Mark Kramer, for example, reflects on
evidence from his discussions with literary journalists suggesting that current
practitioners share a tacit understanding with readers. This understanding is
“so strong that it amounts to a contract: that the writers do what they appear
to do, which is to get reality as straight as they can manage, and not make it
up.”29 Such comments reflect a belief that reality is “discoverable,” and that
literary journalists are part of a shared reality that can be objectively known.
Importantly, Kramer also differentiates between the New Journalists’ project
and contemporary literary journalism. He relates the expectations set by the
dust jacket of Norman Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song (1979), which “bore the
odd description ‘A True Life Novel.’ Although such truth-in-labeling doesn’t
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explicitly demarcate what parts are actual, it’s a good-faith proclamation to
readers that they’ve entered a zone in which a nonfiction writer’s covenant
with readers may be a tease, a device, but doesn’t quite apply.” He asserts that
this category of expectations “[falls] outside the modern understanding of
what literary journalism is.”30
More recently, Keeble and Tulloch write that contemporary literary journalists “claim the real,” a phrase that signifies “an assertion about truthfulness
to verifiable experience, an adherence to accuracy and sincerity which practitioners assert are the crucial features that distinguish their narratives from
‘fiction.’”31 Keeble and Tulloch also acknowledge that this is problematic:
A demand for realism can be represented as an essentially conservative concept, aimed at repulsing the twentieth-century postmodernist project in
writing. . . . In these terms, literary journalism can be presented as a throwback to the idea of a stable text and stable reality that can be narrativised,
a refutation of the pretensions of modernism in which eager journalists
penetrate to “the quick of what’s happening.” But many writers would now
claim, with David Shields: “Story seems to say everything happens for a
reason, and I want to say, No, it doesn’t.”32

It might be concluded that a “demand for realism” takes on different
meanings for different practitioners. “Claiming the real” for some may mean
representing “a phenomenal world that is fundamentally indeterminate.”33
But for others, a common reality is discoverable, and narrative form is alive to
the possibilities of (re)presenting their discoveries.

A

“Responsibilism” and the Epistemic Community

n analysis of epistemic responsibility should take into account the extent
of reporting, and assess the rhetorical situation of a practitioner according to knowledge potentially accessible at the time of writing. Code makes
the point that beliefs are grounded because of what happens in the world:
“the practical consequences of holding certain beliefs have considerable bearing upon the reasonableness [for an individual at a particular point in time],
of holding the belief.”34 An associated point here is that literary journalists are
not alone subject to the requirements of epistemic responsibility. The wider
epistemic community also has a mandate to approach and analyze literary
journalism in an epistemically responsible way. Literary journalists’ immediate epistemic community may include, but is not confined to: their subject(s),
their subjects’ communities, fellow practitioners (past and present), critics,
scholars, editors, publishers, policymakers, grant committee members, and,
of course, readers. Given that such a community is likely to elicit a wide range
of cultural, ideological, political, and institutional perspectives, Code again
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stresses the need for a “responsibilist” approach that considers alternate epistemologies and ethical imperatives.
Code invokes the notion of a contract to explicate the function of an
epistemic community. She writes:
I do not conceive of an epistemic contract as an event which creates obligations but rather as a model for understanding the structure and workings
of epistemic interdependence. . . . This model is useful in explaining the
outrage that occurs when trust is violated. It helps account for the conviction that something tangible was violated and that the violator is thereby
accountable. . . . . Legislation preventing false advertising shows that, in
the public domain, it is not enough for such agreements to remain tacit.
Our sense that it is reasonable to assume that people will provide accurate
information, to the general agreement to do so, even where the law is not
involved.35

N

arrative theorist Gerard Genette similarly uses the term “contractual
force” to argue that paratexts can be dynamic sites of negotiation for the
truth claims of a text. Genette emphasizes that a reader is not bound to enter
into an agreement about how to approach a text, but maintains “only that,
knowing it, he cannot completely disregard it, and if he wants to contradict it
he must first assimilate it.”36 Genette concludes that whether a reader accepts
or rejects the negotiation offered, “one is better off perceiving it fully and
clearly.”37 This is in fact a matter of epistemic responsibility. A reader may be
“better off” for perceiving an author’s intention, methodology and aims. But
readers, and critics in particular, are also responsible for understanding the
epistemic foundation of a work of literary journalism as they approach it and
offer criticism or praise. Questions such as: “Do I really know what I think I
know?”; “Do I know enough to write as I do?”; “What don’t I know?”; and
“Should I know more or acknowledge incomplete knowledge?” are equally
applicable to the criticism as to the practice of literary journalism.
The question arises: Can literary journalists push boundaries in an epistemically responsible way? Code’s responsibilist approach suggests that individuals
not only can but also should eschew caution and conservatism at times in order
to explore new possibilities. “There must be room,” she argues, “within the
larger sphere where good knowers live, for the Socratic gadfly and for those who
take outrageous stances to keep the epistemic community on its toes, to prevent
it from settling into complacency or inertia. . . . Catalysts of cognitive change
play as vital a role in communities of knowers as do conservers of established
practice.”38 While the New Journalism movement as a whole has been characterized as carrying out this role,39 there are individuals in this comparatively
conservative era who keep the epistemic community on its toes.
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O

A Case of Epistemic (Ir)responsibility?

ne example of two people playing out this role can be found in John
D’Agata’s and Jim Fingal’s The Lifespan of a Fact. Published in 2012, the
book’s generic classification is “Literature/Essays,” leading almost all reviewers to treat it as a work of nonfiction.40 The publisher’s website promotes the
book as a reproduction of an essay by John D’Agata, accompanied by the
correspondence between him and his fact checker, Jim Fingal. The dustcover
of the book states: “[W]hat emerges is a brilliant and eye-opening meditation on the relationship between ‘truth’ and ‘accuracy’ and a penetrating conversation.”41 After publication, it emerged in an interview with the authors
that the initial correspondence between D’Agata and Fingal took between six
months and year, after which the idea of publishing a book was formed. The
Lifespan of a Fact is thus not the original correspondence between Fingal and
D’Agata, but a planned and constructed exchange based on their experience
of the initial fact-checking process.
Silverman notes that one of the four reviewers he contacted regarding the
book was aware that the exchange was created to attain and fulfil a book contract—that it is “by definition not a reproduction, since the book is primarily
made up of text that did not exist prior to the authors embarking on a book
project.”42 Interestingly, the one reviewer who “knew the book was not always
factual” explained that one signal of its constructed nature was that “D’Agata
has a real history of these sort of literary tricks.”43 This echoes Lawrence Weschler’s injunction that readers need to be “intelligent” and “[follow] a person
over years. Then you begin to get a sense of that writer, their voice. And you
approach it as an adult encountering another adult in the world.”44 But this
case highlights a problem in Weschler’s position: D’Agata’s other three reviewers have no less apparent claim to intelligence, and as none were familiar
with his work, they read the publisher’s blurb as a claim to nonfiction status.
The hybrid nature of the genre assignation appeared to have been clarified
by the blurb and publisher’s website in this case, whereas both in fact misled
their expectations. Is this a case of epistemic irresponsibility on the part of the
authors (and/or publishers)? Or does it point out the epistemic responsibility
of reviewers to know their subject—and practitioners—well? Are these two
positions mutually exclusive?
The paratext enacts the issues raised by the content of the book in this
way. The “character” in the exchange, D’Agata, is striving to create an essay
that delivers a genuine experience with art. D’Agata’s fact checker, Fingal,
protests against replacing numerous verifiable facts with inaccuracies, such as
“four” for “eight,” “pink” for “purple,” wind direction, the phase of the moon,
and statistics on suicide. The latter is particularly pertinent, as the original
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article recreates the last day of Levi Presley, a sixteen-year-old whose suicide is
its subject. “D’Agata” here embodies the intellectually virtuous (knowledgeable) practitioner without displaying moral virtue. He argues that nonfiction
is an inadequate term for what he is doing—creating a work of art—and not
one that he would apply to his essay. D’Agata’s refusal to capitulate to the
expectations set by the term “essay” and the (verifiable) subject matter of his
text is based on his intention to produce an experience for the reader that he
claims is not dependent on factual accuracy:
John: What the term “essay” describes is not a negation of genre—as “nonfiction” does—but rather an activity, “an attempt, a trial, an experiment.”.
. . An essay is not a vehicle for facts, in other words, nor for information,
nor verifiable experience. An essay is an experience, and a very human one
at that. It’s an enactment of the experience of trying to find meaning—an
emotional meaning, an intellectual meaning, a political meaning, a scientific one, or whatever goal that artist has set for the text.45

W

hen Fingal suggests that D’Agata give readers “a wink or a nod”—or
disclosure transparency—to signal his intentions, D’Agata responds:
“I’ve been giving readers winks and nods for my entire career, Jim. I’ve edited
anthologies, I’ve written essays, I’ve given lectures, I’ve taught courses . . . all
about this issue. As some point the reader needs to stop demanding that they
be spoon-fed like infants and start figuring out on their own how to deal with
art that they disagree with.”46 This is clearly intentionally provocative, but
it summarizes D’Agata’s position: that nonfiction is a constructed category
with which he fundamentally disagrees as it limits the possibility of creating
a meaningful experience for the reader. Consequently, he does not feel bound
to disclose factual inaccuracies to the reader, as he does not identify his work
as nonfiction.
The exchange is entertaining, but the original article contains a twist as
D’Agata acknowledges that he has replaced facts for rhetorical effect in order
to imbue them with significance they do not inherently hold. After building
a theme around the number nine, based on the (inaccurate) fact that Levi
Presley fell for nine seconds to his death, the article finally reveals: “I think
we knew, however, that he really fell for eight. . . . Sometimes we misplace
knowledge in pursuit of information. Sometimes our wisdom, too, in pursuit
of what’s called knowledge.”47 D’Agata is not, here, reversing his position and
demonstrating that accuracy is important after all. He is underscoring the
point that whether facts are distorted or not, it is part of the human condition to imbue details with meaning, which, he believes, is ultimately a work
of imagination. Facts, by this reasoning, become negligible, and D’Agata’s
commitment to his reader is to provide a greater truth than facts alone.
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Underlying the arguments made by “D’Agata” in the exchange with his
fact checker is a belief that is not explicitly dealt with by either the character
or the author outside the book: that accurate facts cannot be artful. Interestingly, however, the epigraph of The Lifespan of a Fact is split over two pages
that inform the text: “True words are not beautiful” and “Beautiful words
are not true.”48 These two quotations can be read as opinion or factual statements, but it soon becomes apparent that these lines form the underlying
premise of the book. Throughout the exchange, “D’Agata” makes it clear that
the facts are not aesthetically pleasing to his sensibility; thus, he changes them
to provide his prose with rhythm and style. It might be ventured, however,
that while he felt the accurate facts limited his style, it could equally be the
case that “D’Agata’s” style might have changed to accommodate the facts.
The premise that stylish prose cannot arise from verifiable fact is subject to
opinion—or, perhaps, skill. As one practitioner writes,
Like other literary journalists, I’ve found that, in fact, annoying, inconsistent details that threaten to wreck a scene I’m writing are often signals that
my working theories about events need more work, and don’t quite explain
what happened yet. Not tweaking deepens understanding. And getting a
slice of life down authentically takes flexibility and hard labor. 49

T

he term “authentically” here might be replaced with “verifiably” in the
context of epistemic responsibility. “D’Agata” also reminds “Fingal” a
number of times that he is not a journalist, thereby excusing his lack of notes,
attribution of sources, and gaps in his research. However, that he made an
effort to base his essay on the phenomenal reality of Levi Presley’s life and
death, rather than making up an entirely fictional character, suggests that he
is aware of the rhetorical power of nonfiction and that he intends to trade on
it, regardless of the label applied.
In a later interview, (the real) John D’Agata reflected on the fact-checking
process of the original article and writing the book, stating:
I think I’m a little more willing to acknowledge that there is a line somewhere that one shouldn’t cross, but at the same time, I would still insist that
it’s a line that only we as individual writers can draw, only we can determine
where it is, but that we should look for it. We should be on the lookout for
moments when we might be overstepping what’s appropriate.50

D’Agata’s words here reflect Code’s injunction that “there is considerable
scope for freedom in making sense of the world,” but that there are limits to
“what kind of sense can responsibly be made of the world.”51 Should those
limits be acknowledged in works of nonfiction? The “D’Agata” of the text
would argue not. The Lifespan of a Fact plays with questions such as these, but

CODE 47
particularly examines the following: “What are the moral consequences of
my knowing and not telling?” Each “character” represents various viewpoints
throughout the book, but “D’Agata’s” main thrust is that moral consequences
are negligible in art, and that epistemic defence and attempts at transparency
belie the intention of the nonfiction narrator. One actual consequence of the
ambiguous generic status of the book was that many reviewers incorrectly
reviewed it as nonfiction. Interestingly, this is a point the real D’Agata was
more willing to concede than his publishers. A wider consequence may be to
discredit the genre, and, by extension, practitioners who carefully consider
and negotiate their epistemic responsibility. This example also highlights that
some practitioners may set out to intentionally provide their readers with
false or misleading expectations. This may be to make a point—as D’Agata
and Fingal do here—or in order to garner authority for their text that they
have not earned through the research process. But finally, The Lifespan of a
Fact does challenge boundaries. It has opened a discussion—not least among
those who reviewed it as nonfiction—that amounts to an investigation of
both practitioners’ and critics’ epistemic responsibility. D’Agata’s approach
exemplifies that of “the Socratic gadfly.” Code observes that:
[I]t is hard to accommodate this kind of thinker within a responsibilitybased theory. No one is inclined to doubt their interest in knowing well;
rather, the conceptual problem arises because such projects invite the paradoxical conclusion that it could sometimes be necessary to be epistemically
irresponsible, at least in the eyes of the community, to be responsible. Epistemic rebellion, and seemingly outrageous thought experiments subversive
of “received” discourse, cannot, therefore, simply be condemned as treacherous or dismissed as irrational by knowers who are responsibly and openly
committed to making the best sense of the world (particularly if “best” can
be aligned, to some extent, with “creativity” and “inventiveness”).52

W

hile this text has been used as an illustrative example, the intention has
not been to hold up “D’Agata’s” approach as an epistemically responsible one. It does, however, perform an important role in literary journalism’s
epistemic community. The Lifespan of a Fact illustrates several points central
to this discussion: that literary journalists need to be epistemically responsible
toward their epistemic communities; that epistemic communities must also
maintain a “responsibilist” approach to practitioners (and works) of literary
journalism; and that a “contract” arguably exists between members that can
define the terms by which epistemic responsibility may be judged.
Conclusion
The “inevitable lag of the critic behind the artist”53 has been a factor
in the controversy surrounding literary journalism during the past five de-
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cades—a state that is equally true of scholarship. The epistemic community
has, at times, lapsed in its own epistemic responsibility, but more often the
struggle has been to understand epistemological foundations on which pioneering practitioners base their texts. For Code, this struggle is vital for maintaining epistemic competence. Healthy epistemic communities are those that
are self-critical, reflexive, and avoid “any easy calculus for assessing knowledge and belief claims.” They cannot “provide a decision-making scale against
which specific knowledge claims can be measured for validity . . . [o]ne could
not responsibly write ‘a guide for the recognition of responsible knowledge
claims’.”54 As such, the value of Aucoin’s application of Code’s work to literary journalism is significant. This paper recognizes Aucoin’s contribution to
scholarship and practice while endeavouring to (re)articulate Code’s approach
to epistemology, redirecting the discussion to a responsibilist approach. As
Code writes, “[s]hifting the focus of epistemological enquiry to a study of
intellectual virtue and epistemic responsibility will enhance the confidence
that can be lent to knowledge claims, even when absolute certainty is taken to be impossible.”55 Code’s approach is arguably an important branch of
scholarship for literary journalism studies—a branch that has the potential
to enhance confidence in the genre’s claims to represent reality both reliably
and responsibly.
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